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Abstract 3 
Obesity is projected to increase in the coming years, despite the various socioeconomic 4 
policies implemented by governments and policy makers. As a result, some studies have 5 
suggested that obesity should be looked at from a psychological point of view, that is, 6 
individuals’ propensity to become addicted to the consumption of fat-rich foods. Although 7 
previous studies have supported this, the results have been inconclusive: methodologically 8 
and geographically. This study uses a robust approach to elicit the risk and time preferences 9 
of food consumers. It goes further to ascertain the correlations between these parameters and 10 
obesity. Despite the methodological and geographical differences, our results support a strong 11 
relationship between body mass index and risk aversion, but not for loss aversion. In 12 
addition, time discounting significantly influences individuals’ propensity to increase body 13 
mass index. 14 
Keywords: Prospect theory, Risk preferences, Time preferences; Body Mass Index, 15 
Catalonia 16 
1. Introduction 17 
The World Health Organization (WHO) considers obesity to be the most important cause of 18 
chronic illness and an epidemic in the 21st century, given its impact on morbidity, quality of 19 
life, and healthcare expenditure (WHO, 2016). People who are overweight or obese make up 20 
about 39% and 23% of the adult population in Spain (Gutiérrez-Fisac et al., 2012). People 21 
with obesity are at risk of heart attack and diabetes and show highly decreased levels of both 22 
productivity and life expectancy (Allison et al., 1999; Colditz, 1992).  Economically, soaring 23 
obesity rates have led to a significant increase in both direct medical costs and the indirect 24 
costs resulting from lost productivity (McGinnis and Foege, 1993; Sturm, 2002; Wolf and 25 
Colditz, 1998). 26 
Several socioeconomic factors have been found to play a major role in the high prevalence 27 
rate of obesity in Spain (Costa-Font and Gil, 2006). As a result, various socioeconomic 28 
policies have been targeted at obese people or people with a high risk of becoming obese.                         29 
However, obesity is projected to increase in the coming years (OECD, 2017). As a result, 30 
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some studies have suggested that obesity should be looked at from the context of individuals’ 1 
propensity to become addicted to the consumption of certain foods (Cawley, 1999). 2 
Addiction to unhealthy behaviours, such as alcohol, drugs, and smoking, are usually 3 
explained by the rational addiction model of Becker and Murphy (1988). From the rational 4 
addiction context, obese individuals value the benefit from current consumption more than 5 
the present value of future health implications that result from overeating. The study of the 6 
interdependencies between the rate of time preferences, the coefficient of risk aversion, and 7 
an addiction to unhealthy behaviours, such as smoking, drinking, and unhealthy eating, has 8 
become popular (Ida and Goto, 2009). 9 
Therefore, researchers have hypothesized that higher time discount rates could explain why 10 
some people are more likely to have unhealthy diets and respond unsuccessfully to 11 
interventions aimed at encouraging dietary change (Leitch et al., 2013; Rollins et al., 2010). 12 
Impatient people may disregard the long-term effects of fat and sugar consumption and invest 13 
in less healhty foods rather than in nutrient-rich foods. Previous studies have found that the 14 
extent of time discounting varies considerably among persons (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 15 
1982; Frederick et al., 2002; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), tending to be higher among younger 16 
persons (Reimers et al., 2009; Steinberg et al., 2009), individuals with lower socioeconomic 17 
status (Reimers et al., 2009), less-educated persons (Jaroni et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2013), and 18 
those with a higher risk of obesity (McLaren, 2007).  19 
Aside from time discounting, people’s risk preferences (risk aversion and loss aversion) have 20 
a predominant effect on their consumption decisions. Past literature has shown that 21 
individuals’ struggles to maintain a healthy diet might be due to the existence of the 22 
phenomenon of loss aversion in consumption decision making. Loss aversion strongly 23 
influences the tendency for people to base decisions on movements away from a current state 24 
rather than on the final outcome and to regard losses from that state more than gains 25 
(Kahneman et al., 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  26 
Psychological factors, such as risk and time preferences, have a major influence on how 27 
individuals make food choices. In summary, the literature supports that obese and overweight 28 
persons are less risk averse or more loss averse (Anderson and Mellor, 2008; de Oliveira et 29 
al., 2016; Davis et al., 2010) and exhibit higher time preference rates (Borghans and 30 
Golsteyn, 2006; Komlos et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2005).  31 
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However, with the exception of de Oliveira et al. (2016), all studies mentioned above were 1 
partial, in the sense that they only consider the relationship between risk attitudes or time 2 
preferences of respondents with their body mass index. As in de Oliveira et al. (2016), the 3 
aim of this study is to jointly consider the role that risk and time preferences play in the 4 
tendency to become overweight and obese. Furthermore, this study tries to overcome some of 5 
the limitations of that study, namely: 1) as the focus was on people with low educational 6 
background, the visual multiple price list of Eckel and Grossman (2008) was used to elicit 7 
both risk and time preferences, which did not allow to account for subjects’ attitudes toward 8 
losses, 2) their methodological framework was not flexible enough to estimate prospect 9 
theory parameters (risk aversion, loss aversion, and probability weighting), which has been 10 
proved to be very useful in behavioural economics, as we will show later, and 3) the method 11 
used to estimate the discount rate did not allow for differentiating whether subjects exhibit 12 
hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic or exponential time discounting behaviour.  13 
To tackle these limitations, in this study we have adopted the incentivised double multiple 14 
price list (MPL) approach of Tanaka et al. (2010) as it allows estimating both prospect theory 15 
parameters (risk, loss aversion, and probability weighting) as well as time preference 16 
parameters (discount rate, present bias, and hyperbolicity) of consumers. This approach has 17 
been previously used in other domains to elicit both risk and time preferences such as 18 
Anderson and Mellor (2008) and Tanaka et al. (2010), to estimate risk and time preferences 19 
of the Danish adult population and Vietnamese rice farmers, respectively. However, this 20 
study constitutes, up to our knowledge, the first application on the consumers domain to 21 
investigate how risk and time preference parameters correlate with body mass index. To do 22 
that, two main tasks have been performed: 1) we have designed two lotteries to calculate risk 23 
and time preference parameters, 2) we have analyzed the impact of such parameters on 24 
participants’ body mass index. In the latter, we have controlled for a variety of individual 25 
covariates, including marital status, education, age, and income, that have been shown in the 26 
literature to be common drivers of obesity. 27 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: section 2 provides a brief literature 28 
review on risk and time preferences. Section 3 discusses the sampling technique, 29 
experimental design, and the empirical methods used to derive our risk- and time-preference 30 
parameters. Section 4 presents and discusses the main results. The paper ends with some 31 
concluding remarks and limitations in section 5. 32 
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2. Conceptual framework and literature review  1 
2.1 Risk preferences 2 
The expected utility (EU) theory has long been the standard approach in behavioural 3 
economics modelling. Based on this framework, several methods have been developed to 4 
estimate the concavity of the utility function, such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 5 
(BART), the Eckel and Grossman method, the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) 6 
scale, or the Multiple Price Lists, among the most relevant.   7 
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002) presents subjects with a 8 
sequence of choices of whether or not to gain additional money by pumping more air into a 9 
balloon, with each pump coming with the risk of losing the accumulated gains if the balloon 10 
pops. BART has been used to study risk attitudes across a variety of subfields, such as 11 
neuroscience (Fecteau et al., 2007), drug addiction (Bornovalova et al., 2005), and 12 
psychopathology (Hunt et al., 2005), However, it is not clear if this method, initially designed 13 
for analysing financial risk behaviour could be extended to other domains. In addition, BART 14 
requires a computer and multiple implementation trials, making it time consuming and 15 
inapplicable when there are no computers.  16 
In the Eckel and Grossman method (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), participants are presented 17 
with a number of gambling games and are asked to choose one that they would like to play. 18 
This method has been used by Reynaud and Couture (2012) and Dave et al. (2010). Even 19 
though this method produces significantly less noisy estimates of risk preferences, compared 20 
to BART, it does not allow the researcher to differentiate between different degrees of risk-21 
seeking behaviour.  22 
The Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale developed by Weber et al. (2002) 23 
elicitates risk parameters through a questionnaire. DOSPERT relies on the individual’s self-24 
reported propensity for risk. The scale contains 40 items: eight items in the domains of 25 
recreation, health, social, and ethical risks and four items in the domains of gambling and 26 
investment. DOSPERT has been applied by Hanoch et al. (2006) to elicit the domain-specific 27 
nature of risk preferences. Despite the simple nature of the DOSPERT method, Charness et 28 
al. (2013) argue that the elicited risk preferences may not reflect an individual’s true attitudes 29 
toward risk in each domain since the technique is not incentivized. 30 
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Holt and Laury (2002) popularized the use of the Multiple Price List lottery to estimate the 1 
concavity of the individual’s utility function. The MPL has become very popular and has 2 
been widely used by researchers to compare risk attitudes across a wide array of contexts and 3 
environments (Anderson and Mellor, 2008). However, as in the previous methods based on 4 
the expected utility framework, it only allows researchers to estimate the concavity of the 5 
utility function.  6 
Prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman and Tversky,1979) and the mental accounting framework 7 
(Thaler, 1980) have become very relevant in recent literature on behavioural economics 8 
(Harrison et al., 2010; Liu and Huang, 2013; Tanaka et al., 2010). PT postulates that risk 9 
preferences are not solely based on the concavity of the utility function but also on 10 
probability weighting and individuals’ aversion to losses. Integration of loss aversion and 11 
probability weighing into individual preferences has enabled the prospect theory to explain a 12 
wide variety of economic phenomena that were considered puzzles from the expected utility 13 
point of view (Nguyen and Leung, 2009). Tanaka et al. (2010), following the Holt and 14 
Laury’s Multiple Price List lottery, proposed the double Multiple Price List (MPL) lottery to 15 
allow for the estimation of the three prospect theory parameters: risk aversion, loss aversion, 16 
and probability weighting. They applied it to elicit the risk preferences of Vietnamese 17 
farmers, assuming a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function that was 18 
separable and stationary across time.  19 
The double MPL was initially criticized on the basis that respondents might not understand 20 
the lottery, which could reduce the reliability of the results. In addition, participants might 21 
make inconsistent decisions by switching more than once. However, Anderson and Galinsky 22 
(2006) and Tanaka et al. (2010) dealt with these limitations by imposing strict monotonicity 23 
on revealed preferences and enforced transitivity. Several studies in the past have tried to 24 
establish a relationship between obesity and risk attitudes, such as de Oliveira et al. (2016), 25 
Borghans and Golsteyn (2006), Komlos et al. (2004), and Smith et al. (2005). However, none 26 
of these studies used the double MPL lottery, which is one of the main novelties of this study. 27 
2.2 Time Preferences 28 
Delay discounting can be defined as the extent to which people discount rewards (e.g. money, 29 
food, weight loss, etc.) as a function of having to wait for it (Reynolds et al., 2004). A low 30 
time discount rate indicates that an individual is patient and has self-control; on the contrary, 31 
a high time discount rate indicates that the individual is impatient and puts more emphasis on 32 
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current gains over future rewards. Policies, especially fiscal policies, addressing obesity-1 
related problems and its determinants, are likely to be flawed if there is a strong relationship 2 
between the rate of time preference and the propensity to become obese. Interventions need 3 
to factor these behavioural patterns into policy development and implementation.  4 
Measurement approaches to discount rates vary due to: i) how surveys are administered; ii) 5 
the technique by which the discount rate is to be estimated; and (iii) whether rewards are real 6 
or hypothetical monetary choices. Surveys are usually administered in two ways: i) by 7 
questionnaire or ii) by a computerized method. Discount rates and present bias parameters are 8 
usually estimated by fitting an exponential discounting model (Kirby and Maraković, 1995; 9 
Myerson and Green, 1995), a hyperbolic model (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Mazur, 1987; 10 
Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), or a quasi-hyperbolic discount method (Benhabib et al., 2010). 11 
Hyperbolic and exponential discount models only measure the discount rate of money, while 12 
the quasi-hyperbolic discount model measures both the discount rate and present bias. The 13 
literature supports that exponential discounting performs poorly in the presence of 14 
experimental data (Frederick et al., 2002). As such, Laibson (1997) proposed a quasi-15 
hyperbolic discounting model that performs better with field data. Moreover, previous 16 
literature supports that individuals are present bias and have high affinity toward high 17 
discount rates. 18 
Tanaka et al. (2010) suggested a general time-preference model based on Benhabib et al’s. 19 
(2010) experimental approach that is able to estimate three time-preference parameters: 20 
discount rates, present bias, and hyperbolicity. Moreover, their model also allows for 21 
comparing its performance in relation to the exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic 22 
models mentioned above. 23 
The literature also provides a few studies that have tried to relate time preferences to 24 
unhealthy behaviours (Appelhans et al., 2012; Leitch et al., 2013; Rollins et al., 2010), all of 25 
them supporting the existence of a strong relationship using different functional forms to 26 
estimate the discount parameter. This study is the first attempt to analyse the relationship 27 
between BMI and time preferences by adopting a flexible functional form, allowing us to 28 
jointly consider discount rates, present bias, and hyperbolicity.  29 
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3. Methodological framework 1 
3.1 The sample 2 
Our sample comprised 180 respondents from the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (Spain). 3 
The sample was stratified taking into account the 2012 distribution of the population by BMI 4 
and age from the National Health Survey. Survey participants signed a letter of 5 
confidentiality before the start of the experiment and were paid 30 euros for completing the 6 
survey. Each participant completed the entire questionnaire in an average of 60–75 minutes. 7 
Out of the 180 respondents who completed the questionnaire, seven submitted incomplete 8 
questionnaires and were, therefore, discarded. Each survey covered detailed information on 9 
individual characteristics and participants’ choices for risk- and time-preferences games. 10 
Respondents were asked to state their body mass index, which was validated after the 11 
experiment. The weight and height of the respondents were validated by trained personnel 12 
using a calibrated digital scale and stadiometer, respectively. BMI was calculated using the 13 
standard formula: kg/m2. Participants were categorized into three groups: underweight1 and 14 
normal weight group (<24.9); overweight group (25–29.9); and obesity group (>30.0) based 15 
on WHO criteria.  16 
3.2 Risk Preferences 17 
Under the PT, the individual’s utility function can be expressed as follows: 18 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦;𝑝𝑝) = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)     (1) 19 
where 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = �
𝑥𝑥σ                      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆𝜆(−𝑥𝑥σ)        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 < 0                                                     (2) 20 
  and 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝[−(− ln𝑝𝑝)𝛾𝛾]     (3) 21 
PT(x, y; p) is the expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of the outcome (x, 22 
y) with the corresponding probability (p, 1 − p). In our experiment, (x, y; p) was specified for 23 
plan A and plan B in all scenarios. Note that the value function v(x) should be estimated with 24 
𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎 for x > 0 or –λ(−𝑥𝑥σ) for x < 0. The parameter σ represents the concavity of the value 25 
function (risk aversion)—high values indicate respondents are risk loving; λ represents the 26 
degree of loss aversion—high values indicating respondents are more loss averse; and γ is a 27 
proxy for the nonlinear probability weighting.  28 
                                                          
1 The underweight and normal weight categories were combined due to the lower number of participants (2% of 
the sample) falling into the underweight category. 
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Experiment design 1 
To elicit the three PT parameters (σ, λ, and γ), respondents were given three series of games 2 
that contained 35 pair-wise choices. Appendix A shows the three series of games. Series 1 3 
consists of 14 games. Series 2 consists of 14 games, and Series 3 consists of seven games. In 4 
each game, the respondent is offered two plans: plan A and plan B. For instance, in series 1, 5 
the first game shows that plan A offers 30% chance of receiving 4 euros and 70% chance of 6 
receiving 1 euro, while plan B offers 10% chance of receiving 6.8 euros and 90% chance of 7 
receiving 0.5 euros. Since there are 14 games, each respondent has to decide whether he or 8 
she prefers plan A or plan B for each row2.  9 
Following Tanaka et al. (2010), monotonicity was imposed on the respondents’ choice 10 
decisions, indicating that if respondent i switches at row q for series 1, we conclude that 11 
he/she prefers plan A over plan B at row q-1 and prefers plan B over plan A at row q. Thus, 12 
each respondent had three options: a) choose plan A throughout all games; b) choose plan B 13 
throughout all games; and c) choose plan A for a certain number of games and then switch to 14 
plan B for the rest. Individuals who are more averse to loss would choose plan A a greater 15 
number of times over plan B. Series 2 followed the same procedure as in series 1. The loss-16 
aversion parameter is calculated using series 3. Contrary to the previous two series, payoffs in 17 
this series were either positive or negative.  18 
After the respondent completed the experiment, two bingo cages were used to determine the 19 
money that each respondent took home. The first bingo cage contained 35 numbered balls 20 
(indicating which row/question to play), while the second contained 10 numbered balls 21 
(indicating the probability). If ball number 10 was randomly selected from the first bingo 22 
cage, this meant that the subject would play row/question 10 out of the 35 questions. Once 23 
the question has been determined, a ball would be drawn from the 10 numbered balls in the 24 
second bingo and the selected question was played according to the subject’s plan. For 25 
instance, if the subject drew the ball number 2 from the second bingo and had previously 26 
chosen plan A, he or she would have earned 4 Euro (or 0.5 Euro if the respondent had chosen 27 
plan B).  28 
Calculating risk parameters 29 
The switching points from series 1 and series 2 are used to estimate the curvature of the 30 
utility function (risk aversion) and the nonlinear probability-weighting parameter of each 31 
                                                          
2 The maximum amount offered in Plan B was 170€, equivalent to the regulated minimum salary for one week. 
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participant. Calculated parameter estimates3 of risk aversion and probability weighting for 1 
different combinations of the switching points in series 1 and series 2 are shown in Table 1 2 
and Table 2, respectively. For instance, from Table 1, if the respondent switched at game 5 in 3 
series 1 and game 3 in series 2, then the corresponding risk aversion parameter is 1.0, 4 
indicating risk neutral. Also, for the probability-weighting parameter, if the respondent 5 
switched at game 5 in series 1 and game 3 in series 2, then the corresponding risk aversion 6 
parameter is 0.8, indicating overweighting of low probabilities. 7 
Paste Table 1 here 8 
Paste Table 2 here 9 
After obtaining the risk-aversion and probability-weighting parameters from both series 1 and 10 
series 2, we can estimate the loss-aversion parameter using the switching points in series 3. 11 
This was achieved by writing out an inequality for the switiching points of series 3 and 12 
introducing the risk parameter into the equation  1 (see Liu and Huang, 2013). 13 
3.3 Time preferences 14 
Following Benhabib et al. (2004) and Tanaka et al. (2010), we have estimated a general time-15 
preference model that nested other models that have been traditionally used in the literature to 16 
elicit time preferences: exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Under the 17 
general framework, the present value of income, y, at time t>0 adopts the following 18 
expression: 19 
 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(1 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟)1/(1−𝜃𝜃)     (4) 20 
where r, 𝑦𝑦, and 𝜃𝜃 are the time discounting, present bias, and hyperbolicity parameters of the 21 
time preference function. If  𝑦𝑦 = 1, as 𝜃𝜃 approaches 1, then the discounted value of y reduces 22 
to exponential discounting (𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) in the limit. However, if 𝑦𝑦 = 1, when 𝜃𝜃 = 2, the 23 
discounted value reduces to a hyperbolic discounting model (1/(1+rt)). In the same way, if 24 
𝜃𝜃 = 1 (in the limit) and 𝑦𝑦 is free, the discounted value reduces to a quasi-hyperbolic 25 
                                                          
3Example when a respondent switch from plan A to B at the fifth question in series 1 and at the third question in 
series 2, the following inequalities should hold. Average estimates are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
4σexp[−(−ln.3)α]+1σexp[−(−ln.7)α]>9.3σexp[−(−ln.1)α ]+ 0.5σ exp[−(−ln.9)α ], 
4σexp[−(−ln.3)α]+1σexp[−(−ln.7)α]<10.6σexp[−(−ln.1)α ]+ 0.5σ exp[−(−ln.9)α ], 
4σexp[−(−ln.9)α]+ 3σexp[−(−ln.1)α]> 5.6σexp[−(−ln.7)α ]+ 0.5σ exp[−(−ln.3)α ], 
4σexp[−(−ln.9)α]+ 3σexp[−(−ln.1)α]< 5.8σexp[−(−ln.7)α ]+ 0.5σ exp[−(−ln.3)α ]. 
10 
 
discounting model (𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟). These restrictions imposed on the general model allow us to 1 
estimate and compare four time discounting models. 2 
Experiment Design 3 
The basic experimental design for eliciting individual discount rates and present bias follows 4 
the approach of Tanaka et al. (2010). The experiment started by reading the following 5 
instruction to participants: “In this game, you will receive money either today or sometime in 6 
the future, depending on the choices you make. There are 75 games (Appendix B). In each 7 
game, we will offer you two plans: plan A or plan B. We would like you to choose either plan 8 
A or plan B for each question.” The experiment lasted about 35 minutes. A trusted agent4 was 9 
chosen who would keep the money until the delayed delivery date to ensure subjects believed 10 
the money would be delivered. The agents were instructed to deliver the money to the 11 
respondent, which tried to equalize the pure transaction costs of receiving money 12 
immediately (i.e. at the end of the experiment) or in the future. In the latter case, the 13 
participant placed the money into an envelope, sealed it, and wrote his (her) name and the 14 
date of delivery on the envelope. All envelopes were given to the trusted agency. 15 
After the instruction, each respondent in our experiment was given payoff tables as shown in 16 
appendix B to elicit their discount rates for money and present bias. Each payoff matrix gives 17 
the respondent the choice to choose between plan A, corresponding to an amount y euro over 18 
a period of 3 days to 3 months, and plan B to earn an amount x today. Whilst the amount 19 
earned in option A remains constant, the amount earned increases in option B as the 20 
respondent moves down the five games in each of the 15 series considered. As in the 21 
previous experiment, to determine the amount of money the respondent took home and when, 22 
a bingo cage containing 75 numbered balls was used. At the end of the experiment, each 23 
respondent was asked to draw one ball to determine which game would be played for real 24 
money. The amount earned varied between 0.5 euros and 30 euros. As an example, from 25 
appendix B, suppose that the i-th respondent drew ball 21. If he or she had chosen plan A, 26 
then he/she would be paid 30 euros in 1 month (the money was placed in an envelope, was 27 
closed and signed by the respondent, and delivered to the trusted agent). However, if he/she 28 
had chosen plan B, then he/she received 5 euros on the same day of the experiment.  29 
                                                          
4 In this study, the trusted agent was the recruitment company, as normally citizens participating in our 




The probability that respondent i will choose an immediate reward x over the delayed reward 1 
y in t days by P(x>(y,t))  was described by the logistic function: 2 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥 > (𝑦𝑦, 𝑟𝑟)) 1
1+exp (−𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥−𝑦𝑦)𝛽𝛽(1−(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)1 1−𝜃𝜃⁄ ))
    (5) 3 
The time-preference parameters r, β, and θ are recovered from the logistic regression 4 
function, where µ is the noise coefficient.  5 
4. Results  6 
4.1 Some preliminary results 7 
The main household characteristics of the sample used in this paper are shown in Table 3. 8 
About 69% of the respondents in our dataset were married, the remaining being single, 9 
divorced, or widowed. More than 90% of the respondents had more than a basic education: 10 
trained professionals or secondary school or university graduates. About 32% of the 11 
respondents earned the average salary in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (Spain) with the 12 
rest earning more than the average salary. The average weight and height in our sample were 13 
69.88 kg and 1.66 meters, respectively, leading to an average BMI of 25.36 kg/m2.  14 
Paste Table 3 here 15 
The BMI distribution among the sample is shown in Figures 1 and 2. The distribution was 16 
skewed to the right, indicating that the majority of the respondents had a BMI greater than the 17 
25 kg/m2. Only one respondent had a BMI greater than 40 kg/m2. Overweight and obese 18 
people represented 37.8 and 10.9 percent of the sample, respectively. These figures are close 19 
to those estimated for the Barcelona population in 2012 by the Public Health Department5 20 
(35.2% of the populace were overweight and 13.8% were obese).  21 
Paste Figure 1 here  22 
Paste Figure 2 here 23 
In relation to risk attitudes, Table 4 shows the average number of choices made by 24 
respondents in series 1 and 2 (see Appendix A). The numbers in the first column and row 25 
correspond to the switching points in series 1 and 2. The frequency numbers in the table 26 
represent the number of subjects who switched at that particular combination of switching 27 
points in series 1 and 2. The bolded figures correspond to the number of respondents whose 28 
choices would correspond to those predicted by the expected utility. As can be observed, for 29 
                                                          
5 https://www.diba.cat/es/web/entorn-urba-i-salut/sobrepes-i-obesitat  
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this particular experiment, the results indicate that the majority of the respondents made their 1 
choices outside the expected utility (EU) theory.  2 
Paste Table 4 here 3 
The calculated prospect theory (PT) parameters are shown in Table 5.  The average risk-4 
aversion parameter was 0.588, indicating that, on average, respondents are risk averse. The 5 
average loss-aversion parameter is 3.67, which also indicates that, globally, respondents are 6 
loss averse. The average of the nonlinear probability-weighting parameter is 0.69 (less than 7 
1), meaning that the majority of the respondents have a tendency to overweigh low 8 
probabilities. According to Tanaka et al. (2010), if 𝛾𝛾 =1 and 𝜆𝜆 = 1, then the utility function 9 
reduces to the EU function. We strongly reject this hypothesis in our experiment, indicating 10 
that PT is the adequate framework to analyse risk preferences within our sample. In addition 11 
to the calculated sample averages, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the normal distribution of the 12 
risk-aversion and loss-aversion coefficients among participants, respectively. The distribution 13 
of the risk-aversion coefficient shows an affinity toward lower risk since the majority of the 14 
respondents are found on the left side of the normal distribution. In relation to loss aversion, 15 
Figure 4 does not support the absence of loss aversion since the coefficient is above 0. Most 16 
respondents have a loss-aversion coefficient between 0.06 and 11.79; larger loss-aversion 17 
coefficients indicate a higher aversion to losses. 18 
Paste Figure 3 here 19 
Paste Figure 4 here 20 
Paste Table 5 here 21 
4.2 Risk Preferences and Body Mass Index 22 
To analyse the relationship between risk preferences and BMI, we estimated, by ordinary 23 
least squares, three regressions of the curvature of the utility function (σ), the loss aversion 24 
parameter (λ), and probability-weighting parameter (γ) against BMI, while controlling for 25 
socioeconomic characteristics. Robust standard errors are reported for all three equations in 26 
Table 6. As can be observed, we have found a significant positive relationship between risk 27 
aversion and BMI indicating that less risk averse persons have a higher propensity to develop 28 
higher BMI. This result is consistent with previous studies by Anderson and Mellor (2008) 29 
and de Oliveira et al. (2016). This results also confirms the rational addiction theory, which 30 
postulate that less risk averse individuals are willing to take the risk of eating unhealthy foods 31 
13 
 
despite the negative health consequences. No significant relationship was found between loss 1 
aversion and probability weighting and BMI. This means that even though obese people are 2 
less risk averse, the propensity to become obese is independent of subjects’ aversion to loss.  3 
Some control covariates had significant relationships with the curvature of the utility function 4 
(σ), the loss-aversion parameter (λ), and the probability-weighting parameter (γ). The 5 
strongest effects suggest older subjects were more risk averse, while lower income subjects 6 
were less risk-averse. These results confirm hypothetical studies that found older adults to be 7 
more risk averse (Botwinick and Thompson, 1966; Kogan and Wallach, 1961). The 8 
relationship between income and risk tend to contradict previous studies that found that risk 9 
aversion reduces some as income increases (Barsky et al., 1997; Donkers et al., 2001). 10 
Studies like Levin et al. (1988) found that women are more risk averse than men. However, 11 
we did not find any significant results.  12 
Paste Table 6 here 13 
4.3 Time Preferences and Body Mass Index 14 
A significant share of previous literature that tried to elicit individual time preferences was 15 
based on the estimation of an exponential discounting model. However, this model has often 16 
been rejected by experimental and field data (Frederick et al., 2002). The results in Table 7 17 
show that we have estimated four time-preference models, with equations 1–3 being nested in 18 
equation 4 based on restrictions imposed on beta (𝑦𝑦) and/or theta (θ). The statistical 19 
performance, in terms of the R2, improves from equation 1 to equation 3. This suggests that 20 
the quasi-hyperbolic and the general model with unrestricted beta and theta are superior to the 21 
exponential and hyperbolic models. The advantage of the quasi-hyperbolic model over both 22 
the exponential and hyperbolic model is that, with beta being unrestricted, the quasi-23 
hyperbolic model allows the estimation of both present bias and discount rate. Similarly, the 24 
general model goes further to estimate hyperbolicity (θ) of the preference model (see Tanaka 25 
et al., 2010). From the general model, the parameters for discount rate, present bias, and 26 
hyperbolicity are 0.006, 0.82, and 3.513, respectively. This implies that our respondents 27 
should trade 78.99 euros today for 100 euros in a week and 71.27 today for 100 euros in one 28 
month. However, estimating the general model with unrestricted θ does not improve R2 29 
compared with the estimation of the quasi-hyperbolic model, so we only focused our 30 
attention on the quasi-hyperbolic discounting. 31 
Paste Table 7 here  32 
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To identify the relationship between the time preference and subjects’ demographic 1 
covariates, we introduced BMI and control covariates into the quasi-hyperbolic time-2 
preference model. The quasi-hyperbolic time-preference parameters were derived using the 3 
logistic model described below: 4 
(𝑥𝑥 > (𝑦𝑦, 𝑟𝑟)) 1
1+exp (−𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥−𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦[ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟])))
       (6) 5 
where 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑦𝑦0 + ∑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,      𝑓𝑓 = 𝑓𝑓0 + ∑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,  Xi are demographic variables described above. 6 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 are the estimated coefficients associated with the Xi.  7 
Estimated parameters from both equations are shown in Table 8. As can be observed, BMI is 8 
positively correlated with impatience (higher discount rates). The implication is that people 9 
who are impatient have a tendency to develop higher BMI. This result is consistent with that 10 
from Borghans and Golsteyn (2006); Scharff (2009); Smith et al. (2005); Weller et al. (2008); 11 
and Zhang and Rashad (2008) who showed that impatience positively correlates with a higher 12 
BMI. 13 
Among the socioeconomic covariates, people with only a primary education are more 14 
impatient as compared to people with a secondary and university education. Fuchs (1982), 15 
Huffman et al. (2017) and Tanaka et al. (2010) also found lower discount rates among highly 16 
educated people. This is plausible as people who drop out of school usually prefer to work 17 
and earn an income as soon as possible seeing the benefit of higher education as delaying the 18 
gratification from today’s income. Finally, we have found that females are more impatient 19 
than males in the study area, while Dittrich and Leipold (2014) showed the contrary. 20 
Present bias is significant at the 1% level, suggesting the existence of present bias among 21 
respondents. Tanaka et al. (2010) also found the existence of present bias among farmers in 22 
Vietnam. While Courtemanche et al. (2015) predicted that present bias increases with BMI, 23 
this study shows that present bias increases with BMI only among women.  24 
Paste Table 8 here 25 
5. Conclusions 26 
Obesity in Spain is on the rise despite the numerous sociopolitical and socioeconomic 27 
policies that have been implemented during the past decades. The framework of rational 28 
addiction models the behaviour of individuals from the context of risk and time preferences. 29 
15 
 
Therefore, many hypothetical studies have suggested a strong correlation between risk, time 1 
preferences, and obesity rates. However, no such empirical study has been carried out in 2 
Spain to ascertain whether such a relationship exists.  3 
The aim of this study was to investigate and ascertain the relationship between risk attitudes, 4 
time preferences, and BMI in Spain. We used the experimental approach of Tanaka et al. 5 
based on the prospect theory framework to estimate three risk preference parameters: risk 6 
aversion, loss aversion, and probability weighting. Similarly, based on the experimental 7 
approach of Tanaka et al. and the empirical framework of Benhabib et al. 2007, we estimated 8 
four time-preference models (exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, and the general 9 
model); in the quasi-hyperbolic model, we tested for the relationships between present bias 10 
and time discounting and obesity. 11 
The experimental data shows the existence of risk aversion, aversion toward losses, and 12 
impatience among our respondents. BMI was significant and positively associated with risk 13 
aversion. In addition, impatience was found to be highly associated with people with a high 14 
BMI. Our results also confirm that risk and time preferences are independent of the 15 
methodological framework. No significant relationship exists between probability weighting, 16 
loss aversion, and present bias and BMI among our subjects. 17 
Considering the importance of risk and time preferences on the development of obesity, 18 
economic policies should begin to factor such individual heterogeneity into economic policy 19 
instruments. For instance, policy recommendations that suggest taxes or fiscal policies can 20 
influence consumer behaviour leading to a reduction in obesity should consider psychological 21 
differences in demand modelling. In addition, the government should develop policies 22 
targeted at specific segments of the society instead of a one-for-all policy goal that yields 23 
little or no results. 24 
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Table 1 Switching point (question) in Series 1 and 2, and approximations of σ (parameter for the curvature of power value function/risk 1 
parameter) 2 
 3 
σ Switching point for series 1 
Series 
2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Never 
1 1.50 1.40 1.35 1.25 1.15 1.10 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.50 
2 1.40 1.30 1.25 1.15 1.10 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.50 
3 1.30 1.20 1.15 1.10 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 
4 1.20 1.15 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 
5 1.15 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 
6 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 
7 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 
8 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 
9 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 
10 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.20 
11 0.80 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.15 
12 0.75 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.10 
13 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 
14 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 
Never 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 
21 
 
Table 2 Switching point (question) in Series 1 and 2, and α (probability sensitivity parameter in Prelec’s weighting function)1 
α Switching question in series 1 
Series 
2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  Never 
1 0.60 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.40 1.45 
2 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.35 1.40 
3 0.55 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 
4 0.50 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 
5 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 
6 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 
7 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 
8 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 
9 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 
10 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
11 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 
12 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 
13 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 
14 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 
 Never 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.60 
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Table 3 Household characteristic (%) 1 
Variables Mean Std. Error [95% Conf. Interval] 
Probability Weighting 0.64 0.03 0.59 0.69 
Risk Aversion Coefficient 0.58 0.03 0.52 0.63 
Loss Aversion Coefficient 3.67 0.30 3.09 4.26 
Married 0.69 0.04 0.62 0.76 
Age 46.38 1.11 44.20 48.57 
Basic Education 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.12 
Income Less 1500 0.32 0.04 0.25 0.39 
Income Between 1500 And 
2500 
0.42 0.04 0.34 0.49 
Income Between 2500 And 
4000 
0.19 0.03 0.13 0.25 
BMI 25.36 0.32 24.53 25.80 
Body Weight 69.88 1.12 67.67 72.09 
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 Series  1 
 Switching 
Points 
Never 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
 Never 6 10  2 2 3 4 3 3 3 1 1 
 1 6 10  1 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 
 3  1 1        1  
 4 1 1 1 1    1 2    
 5  1   1        
 6     2  1      
 7    1 1  2  1 1   
Series 2 8 1 3 1  3 2  4    1 
 9  1  1 1 4 2 1  1   
 10 1   1 2  3 4     
 11      1 1 1     
 12 1 1  3 1 1 3 1  1 1 1 
 13    1       2  
 14      1    1 2 1 
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Table 5 Risk preference parameters 1 
Variables Mean Std. Error [95% Conf. Interval] 
Probability Weighting 0.64 0.03 0.59 0.69 
Risk Aversion Coefficient 0.58 0.03 0.52 0.63 



















Table 6 —Correlations with determinants of Risk aversion, Loss aversion and 1 
probability sensitivity parameter in Prelec’s weighting function 2 










Explanatory Variables Risk aversion Loss aversion Probability 
weighting 
Body Mass Index 0.014 (-0.008)* 0.000 (0.082) 0.002 (0.007) 
Age -0.003 (-0.002)** 0.057 (0.017)*** 0.000 (0.002) 
Married =1 0.023 (-0.063) 0.995 (0.711) 0.023 (0.066) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.103 (-0.065) -0.660 (0.717) -0.087 (0.060) 
Education(Basic =1) 0.110 (-0.119) 0.574 (1.237) -0.189 (0.098)* 
Income (Less 1500 =1) 0.111 (-0.056)** 0.409 (0.713) 0.078 (0.064) 
Constant 0.399 (-0.207)* 0.562 (2.108) 0.622 (0.194)*** 
30 
 
Table 7 Comparison of Exponential, Hyperbolic, and Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting 1 
Models 2 
choice Exponential   Hyperbolic Quasi-
hyperbolic  
Equation (1) 
Meu 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
Rate 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
Beta   0.800*** 0.816*** 





















Table 8 —Correlations with Present Bias and Discount Rates (OLS) 1 
 Present Bias Discount Rate 
μ 0.130***  
Beta/Rate 1.064*** -0.007 
Gender*BMI 0.011* -0.033 
Married 0.010 -0.167 
Gender -0.296* 0.967* 
Age -0.004 -0.0002 
BMI  -0.006 0.038** 
Primary 0.024 0.704** 
Age square 0.00002** 0.00006 
Coefficients of discount rate are multiplied by 100. *,**,*** respresent significant at 10%, 2 









Appendix A 1 
Series 1 Plan A Plan B 
1 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
6,8€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
2 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
7,5€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
3 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
8,3€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
4 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
9,3€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
5 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
10,6€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
6 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
12,5€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
7 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
15,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
8 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
18,5€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
9 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
22,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
10 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
30,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
11 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
40,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
12 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
60,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
13 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
100,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
14 4€ Yes  
1€ Yes  
170,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
 I choose Plan A for Questions 1-
____ 
I choose Plan B for Questions___ -14 
Series 2 Plan A Plan B 
15 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
5,4€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
16 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
5,6€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
17 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
5,8€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
18 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
6,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
19 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
6,2€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
20 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
6,5€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
21 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
6,8€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
22 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
7,2€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
33 
 
23 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
7,7€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
24 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
8,3€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
25 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
9,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
26 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
10,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
27 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
11,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
28 4€ Yes  
3€ Yes  
13,0€ Yes  
0,5€ Yes  
 I choose Plan A for Questions 15 -
____ 
I choose Plan B for Questions___ - 28 
Series 3 Plan A Plan B 
29 Gain 2,5€ Yes  
Loss       0,4€ Yes  
Gain  3,0€ Yes  
Loss     2,1€ Yes  
30 Gain 0,4€ Yes  
Loss       0,4€ Yes  
Gain  3,0€ Yes  
Loss    2,1€ Yes  
31 Gain 0,1€ Yes  
Loss       0,4€ Yes  
Gain  3,0€ Yes  
Loss    2,1€ Yes  
32 Gain 0,1€ Yes  
Loss       0,4€ Yes  
Gain  3,0€ Yes  
Loss    1,6€ Yes  
33 Gain 0,1€ Yes  
Loss       0,8€ Yes  
Gain  3,0€ Yes  
Loss    1,6€ Yes  
34 Gain 0,1€ Yes  
Loss       0,8€ Yes  
Gain  3,0€ Yes  
Loss    1,4€ Yes  
35 Gain 0,1€ Yes  
Loss       0,8€ Yes  
Gain  3,0€ Yes  
Loss    1,1€ Yes  
 I choose Plan A for Questions 29 -
____ 











Appendix B 1 
 Plan A Plan B 
1 Receive 12€ in a week Receive 2€ today 
2 Receive 12€ in a week Receive 4€ today 
3 Receive 12€ in a week Receive 6€ today 
4 Receive 12€ in a week Receive 8€ today 
5 Receive 12€ in a week Receive 10€ today 
I choose Plan A for Questions1 until ___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 5 
 Plan A Plan B 
6 Receive 12€ in a month Receive 2€ today 
7 Receive 12€ in a month Receive 4€ today 
8 Receive 12€ in a month Receive 6€ today 
9 Receive 12€ in a month Receive 8€ today 
10 Receive 12€ in a month Receive 10€ today 
I choose Plan A for Questions 6 until ___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 10 
 Plan A Plan B 
11 Receive 12€ in 3 months Receive 2€ today 
12 Receive 12€ in 3 months Receive 4€ today 
13 Receive 12€ in 3 months Receive 6€ today 
14 Receive 12€ in 3 months Receive 8€ today 
15 Receive 12€ in 3 months Receive 10€ today 
    I choose Plan A for Questions11 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 15 
 Plan A Plan B 
16 Receive 30€ in a week Receive 5€ today 
17 Receive 30€ in a week Receive 10€ today 
18 Receive 30€ in a week Receive 15€ today 
19 Receive 30€ in a week Receive 20€ today 
20 Receive 30€ in a week Receive 25€ today 
  I choose Plan A for Questions16 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 20 
 Plan A Plan B 
21 Receive 30€ in a month Receive 5€ today 
22 Receive 30€ in a month Receive 10€ today 
23 Receive 30€ in a month Receive 15€ today 
24 Receive 30€ in a month Receive 20€ today 
25 Receive 30€ in a month Receive 25€ today 
  I choose Plan A for Questions 21 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 25 
 Plan A Plan B 
26 Receive 30€ in 3 months Receive 5€ today 
27 Receive 30€ in 3 months Receive 10€ today 
28 Receive 30€ in 3 months Receive 15€ today 
29 Receive 30€ in 3 months Receive 20€ today 
30 Receive 30€ in 3 months Receive 25€ today 
   I choose Plan A for Questions 26 until ___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 30 
35 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
31 Receive 3€ in a week Receive 0,5 today 
32 Receive 3€ in a week Receive 1€ today 
33 Receive 3€ in a week Receive 1,5€ today 
34 Receive 3€ in a week Receive 2€ today 
35 Receive 3€ in a week Receive 2,5€ today 
I choose Plan A for Questions 31 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 35 
 Plan A Plan B 
36 Receive 3€ in a month Receive 0,5 today 
37 Receive 3€ in a month Receive 1€ today 
38 Receive 3€ in a month Receive 1,5€ today 
39 Receive 3€ in a month Receive 2€ today 
40 Receive 3€ in a month Receive 2,5€ today 
  I choose Plan A for Questions 36 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 40 
 Plan A Plan B 
41 Receive 3€ in 3 months Receive 0,5 today 
42 Receive 3€ in 3 months Receive 1€ today 
43 Receive 3€ in 3 months Receive 1,5€ today 
44 Receive 3€ in 3 months Receive 2€ today 
45 Receive 3€ in 3 months Receive 2,5€ today 
  I choose Plan A for Questions 41 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 45 
 Plan A Plan B 
46 Receive 24€ in 3 days Receive 4€ today 
47 Receive 24€ in 3 days Receive 8€ today 
48 Receive 24€ in 3 days Receive 12€ today 
49 Receive 24€ in 3 days Receive 16€ today 
50 Receive 24€ in 3 days Receive 20€ today 
  I choose Plan A for Questions 46 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 50 
 Plan A Plan B 
51 Receive 24€ in 2 weeks Receive 4€ today 
52 Receive 24€ in 2 weeks Receive 8€ today 
53 Receive 24€ in 2 weeks Receive 12€ today 
54 Receive 24€ in 2 weeks Receive 16€ today 
55 Receive 24€ in 2 weeks Receive 20€ today 
  I choose Plan A for Questions 51 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 55 
 Plan A Plan B 
56 Receive 24€ in 2 months Receive 4€ today 
57 Receive 24€ in 2 months Receive 8€ today 
58 Receive 24€ in 2 months Receive 12€ today 
59 Receive 24€ in 2 months Receive 16€ today 
60 Receive 24€ in 2 months Receive 20€ today 
   I choose Plan A for Questions 56 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 60 
36 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
61 Receive 6€ in 3 days Receive 1€ today 
62 Receive 6€ in 3 days Receive 2€ today 
63 Receive 6€ in 3 days Receive 3€ today 
64 Receive 6€ in 3 days Receive 4€ today 
65 Receive 6€ in 3 days Receive 5€ today 
   I choose Plan A for Questions 61 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 65 
 Plan A Plan B 
66 Receive 6€ in 2 weeks Receive 1€ today 
67 Receive 6€ in 2 weeks Receive 2€ today 
68 Receive 6€ in 2 weeks Receive 3€ today 
69 Receive 6€ in 2 weeks Receive 4€ today 
70 Receive 6€ in 2 weeks Receive 5€ today 
   I choose Plan A for Questions 66 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 70 
 Plan A Plan B 
71 Receive 6€ in 2 months Receive 1€ today 
72 Receive 6€ in 2 months Receive 2€ today 
73 Receive 6€ in 2 months Receive 3€ today 
74 Receive 6€ in 2 months Receive 4€ today 
75 Receive 6€ in 2 months Receive 5€ today 
   I choose Plan A for Questions 71 until___ I choose Plan B for Questions___ until 75 
 1 
